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Current U.S. countervailing duty law provides that for a subsidy to be
potentially actionable, it must be provided only to a specific industry or
group of industries. This requirement has been at the heart of several
Commerce Department negative determinations that spawned consider-
able litigation in the Court of International Trade and legislative proposals
to amend the law.
Recently the court issued two more opinions on this subject, clarifying
its direction. And the 100th Congress further considered proposals to
change the law itself. This article reviews these developments and their
implications for U.S. countervailing duty law and practice.
I. Background
Section 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (Act), I defines the
term subsidy for purposes of the countervailing duty (CVD) law. It dis-
tinguishes between export 2 and domestic subsidies, each of which it de-
fines in part through use of an illustrative list of such subsidies. 3 To be
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I. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982).
2. Id. Export subsidies are defined as -[any export subsidy described in Annex A to
the Agreement [on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] (relating to illustrative list of export subsidies)."
3. For export subsidies, the illustrative list is the Annex to the Agreement on Interpre-
tation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (Subsidies Code), 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 (including, e.g., the provision
by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or industry contingent upon export perfor-
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potentially actionable, 4 domestic subsidies must be "provided or required
by government action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of
enterprises or industries." 5
Based in part on this requirement, the Department of Commerce 6 de-
cided in several cases in 1983 that foreign government practices concern-
ing natural resources were not countervailable.
In Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico (Ammonia),7 Carbon
Black from Mexico (Carbon Black),8 Portland Hydraulic Cement and
Cement Clinker from Mexico (Cement),9 and Certain Softwood Products
from Canada (Lumber),10 various U.S. petitioners complained about
Mexican or Canadian government practices that resulted in prices in those
countries for natural resources (natural gas, petroleum feedstock, heavy
fuel oil, and standing timber, respectively) lower than prices prevailing in
the United States. The prices for those inputs, which accounted for a high
proportion of the end products' value, were alleged to reflect subsidies.
In each case, however, Commerce found that the practice concerned
was not limited to a specific industry or group of industries. On this basis
(inter alia), Commerce determined that these particular practices did not
confer countervailable subsidies. I
!1. Litigation
The specificity issue in these and other cases resulted in a number of
suits in the Court of International Trade. Initially the views on the court
seemed to range widely. In Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States12
the court in 1983 approved Commerce's interpretation of "bounty or
mance). For domestic subsidies, the illustrative list is included in the Act itself at § 771(5)(B)(i)-
(iv), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(i)-(iv) (1982) (including, e.g., the provision of capital on terms
inconsistent with commercial considerations).
4. Even if a countervailable subsidy exists, in most cases offsetting countervailing duties
are not imposed unless imports of such subsidized merchandise cause or threaten material
injury to a U.S. industry, or materially retard the establishment of such an industry. See
§§ 303, 703(a), 705(b) and 706(a) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671b(a), 167ld(b) & 167le(a)
(1982 & Supp. I11 1985).
5. Section 771(5)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982).
6. The Department of Commerce is the "administering authority" that determines whether
bounties, grants, or subsidies have been bestowed on imports. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979,
§ 2(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273, 69,274 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1170, 1171 (1982);
Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. §§ 131, 135 (1981).
7. 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination).
8. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination).
9. 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination).
10. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination).
II. Ammonia, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,524; Carbon Black, 48 Fed. Reg. at 29,567; Cement, 48
Fed. Reg. at 43,066; Lumber, 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
12. 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
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grant" in section 303 of the Act 13 as implying some special advantage
conferred on a particular industry or industry group.14 Rejecting peti-
tioner's argument that generally available benefits from government pro-
grams should be countervailable, Judge Maletz required that "at a minimum
either a regional or industry preference [must] be present in order for a
bounty or grant to exist." 15
The next year, however, the same court, in dictum, rejected the prop-
osition that "as a rule, generally available benefits are not subsidies." 16
Claiming to be in harmony with Carlisle, the court in Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. United States17 stated: "[T]here is no reason why a particular ben-
efit cannot be extended without limitation" and still be countervailable. 18
In 1985, in Cabot Corp. v. United States, 19 the court, in reviewing
Commerce's 1983 Carbon Black decision, 20 held that section 303 of the
Act is unconcerned "with the nominal availability of a governmental pro-
gram." 2 1 Instead, "[t]he question is what aid or advantage has actually
been received. ' 22 The court distinguished between generally available
benefits accruing to all citizens, and those actually accruing only to specific
individuals or classes. The court stressed that even though some benefits
may be generally available, their actual bestowal may nonetheless con-
stitute grants to specified, identifiable entities. 23
More recently, however, the court seems to have developed a more
settled interpretation of the specificity test. In PPG Industries, Inc. v.
United States (PPG)24 the court clarified its holding in Cabot. In PPG
the plaintiff had contended that any program that reduced the cost of
producing or exporting must be countervailed irrespective of whether
companies received similar benefits. 25 Defendant relied on the literal ian-
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1303, which applies in CVD investigations of merchandise from countries
other than "countr[ies] under the [Subsidies Code]." Section 701(b) of the Act, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671(b) (1982).
14. 564 F. Supp. at 838.
15. Id. at 837.
16. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237, 1239 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1242; see also Agrexco, Agricultural Export Co. v. United States, 604 F. Supp.
1238 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
19. 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
20. Supra note 8.
21. 620 F. Supp. at 730.
22. Id.
23. The court held: "'The appropriate standard focuses on the defacto case by case effect
of benefits provided to recipients rather than on the nominal availability of benefits." Id. at
732.
24. 662 F. Supp. 258 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
25. Id. at 260.
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guage of section 771(5) of the Act26 in support of Commerce's application
of the specificity or "generally available" test to the facts in that case. 27
In PPG Judge Carman reviewed and clarified the Cabot ruling. On the
one hand, he noted the absurdity of countervailing generally available
public benefits such as education and national defense; on the other, he
noted the absurdity of rendering a competitive benefit noncountervailable
simply by making it "generally available." 28 Ultimately the message of
Cabot, according to Judge Carman, was its focus on a de facto, case-by-
case determination whether a competitive advantage had actually been
conferred on a specific industry or group of industries, rather than on the
nominal availability of such advantage. Judge Carman also noted that the
decision in Cabot with respect to the carbon black industry was influenced
by the fact that no other enterprise or industry had the technology or
ability to make use of the carbon black feedstock or catcracker bottoms
at issue. 29
Applying the thus clarified Cabot principles in PPG, Judge Carman
ruled that the application of certain eligibility requirements for partici-
pation in a program does not per se make the benefits bestowed under
that program countervailable. While narrowly drawn eligibility require-
ments may de facto qualify the benefit as countervailable under the spec-
ificity test, the court found that the eligibility requirements under review
in that case did not render the benefit one that is provided to a discrete
class of beneficiaries and thus satisfied the specificity test. 30
Less than a month later, the court issued another opinion further clar-
ifying the specificity test. In Can-Am Corp. v. United States31 the plaintiff,
relying on Cabot, contended that the Mexican Government conferred a
countervailable subsidy in providing fuel oil at prices below world market
value only to industrial purchasers who used such fuel in Mexico, and
not to exporters of such fuel oil (allegedly a specific industry or group of
industries). The court, however, held that this interpretation of Cabot
was in error. It referred to the PPG court holding that the specificity test
requires Commerce to conduct a de facto, case-by-case analysis to de-
termine whether or not a program provided a subsidy to a specific industry
or group of industries. The court upheld Commerce's finding that all
industrial users of heavy fuel oil can obtain this good at the same price;
26. Section 1677(5) defines the term "subsidy"; § 303 of the Act uses instead the terms
"bounty or grant."
27. 662 F. Supp. at 260.
28. Id. at 264.
29. Id. at 265-66 n.5.
30. Id. at 266-67.
31. 664 F. Supp. 1444 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
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and expressly held that Commerce had applied a test consistent with that
articulated in PPG. In Can-Am the court further ruled that "Commerce
is granted discretion to determine whether a given group is a specific
recipient of a benefit." 32 In the instant case the court held that Commerce
acted within its discretion in determining that all industrial users of fuel
oil were not a specific group of industries withif Mexico. 33
III. Recent Legislative Developments
While judicial interpretation of the specificity test has thus recently
settled the issue, the test remains the target of proposed legislative amend-
ments. On April 30, 1987, the House passed an omnibus trade bill, H.R. 3,34
including a new definition of "subsidy." 35 This amended definition in-
cludes a "special rule" for the application of the specificity test. Under
this rule, Commerce would be required to determine whether the subsidy
concerned was "actually paid to or bestowed on a specific ... industry,
or group of ... industries." 36 Moreover, the special rule expressly pro-
vides that: "A nominal general availability ... is not cause for determining
that [a subsidy] . . . cannot be, or has not been, [so] paid or bestowed." 3 7
In a lengthy explanation of the new "subsidy" definition and the reasons
for change, the House report accompanying this bill 38 stresses the "com-
petitive advantage" language from Cabot.39 Some believe such language
may provide a basis for a substantially broader interpretation of the spec-
ificity test than has to date been the case.
Less than three months later, the Senate passed H.R. 3 as amended,
the amendment being a complete substitute, S. 1420.40 This bill likewise
includes a new definition of subsidy and special rule. 41 The Senate special
32. Id. at 1449.
33. Id.
34. 133 CONG. REC. H2981 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1987).
35. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 153 (1987), 133 CONG. REC. H2982 (daily ed. Apr.
30, 1987).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 123-27 (1987).
39. In Cabot, the court ruled:
The appropriate standard focuses on the defacto case by case effect of benefits provided
to recipients rather than on the nominal availability of benefits.... The definition of
'bounty or grant' under section 1303 as intended by Congress remains as it is embodied
in the case law and later affirmed by Congress in section 1677(5). This definition requires
focusing only on whether a benefit or 'competitive advantage' has been actually conferred
on a 'specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries.'
620 F. Supp. at 732 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
40. 133 CONG. REC. 10,372 (daily ed. July 21, 1987).
41. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 153 (1987), amended by S. 1420, 100th Cong., Ist
Sess. § 333 (1987).
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rule calls for a determination whether "in law or in fact" a subsidy is
provided to a specific industry or group of industries. It, too, adds that
"nominal general availability . . . is not a basis for determining that a
bounty, grant or subsidy is not, or has not been, in fact provided to a
specific ... industry or group thereof.' 4 2 The Senate report indicates
only that under this new rule, the Commerce Department "must deter-
mine whether a bounty [,] grant or subsidy in fact is provided to a specific
industry rather than finding nominal availability of the subsidy to all in-
dustries as a basis for determining that the subsidy is not provided to a
specific industry." 43
IV. Conclusion
The continuing controversy involving the specificity test reflects its
importance in countervailing duty law and practice. Parties continue to
struggle-first at Commerce and then in the courts-for what they con-
sider a reasonable interpretation and application of the current test.
In addition, efforts continue to have the Congress intervene in this
struggle. The Senate bill provisions would simply underscore the newly
emerged judicial consensus for an exclusive de facto application. In light
of accompanying report language, however, House bill provisions could
be construed as perhaps more actively changing the underlying test and
thus its application by Commerce and interpretation by the courts. De-
pending upon developments, the clarification and stability on this issue,
achieved only recently, could be undermined by the enactment of an
amendment spawning yet another series of contentious agency determi-
nations and judicial suits.
42. Id.
43. S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1987).
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